Muslim Brotherhood supporters
In recent years, a ‘moderate’ wing has emerged within the traditionally conservative organisation of the Muslim Brotherhood; challenging many Western stereotypes of Islamism, and raising questions over the group’s political aspirations in the aftermath of the ‘Arab Spring’ in Egypt.
The Muslim Brotherhood has been engaged in a struggle for political space with the Egyptian state ever since it was founded by Hassan Al Banna in 1928. During Egypt’s half century of independence from colonial rule, the state has ruled with an iron fist, using shifting levels of repression and coercion as a means of maintaining its hegemony. By following a conscious political strategy of accommodation within the autocratic regime through contesting national and local elections, as well as working outside of state structures to mobilize popular support, the Muslim Brotherhood have gradually transformed from an introspective, conservative body into a modern, pragmatic and politically-orientated organisation. The crucial driving force behind the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood was their entry into electoral politics, and has been given further impetus by the pervasive ‘liberal democracy’ paradigm of the January 25th ‘Revolution’.
When the Brotherhood was originally set up by Al Banna in 1928 it was largely concerned with socio-religious issues; aiming to instigate gradual social change and at the development of an Islamic state through education and welfare projects. The politicisation of the Muslim Brotherhood came as a result of the growing nationalist movement against British rule, culminating in the ‘Revolution’ of 1952 which brought Gamal Abdel Nasser to power. Although the Brotherhood had initially supported Nasser and his ‘Free Officers’ who seized power in this coup, relations with the new state leaders soon soured and the Brotherhood was quickly forced into an oppositional stance. In 1954 an assassination attempt on Nasser by a Brotherhood member led to a brutal state crackdown on the organisation, with thousands of Brothers tortured and imprisoned.
Since the 1970s, the Muslim Brotherhood has publicly disassociated itself from the violence that marred their earlier years, and seeks to present itself as a peaceful, modern political organisation. The origins of this new ‘moderate’ direction began in the 1960s and 1970s, with the entry of Muslim Brotherhood candidates into student union and professional syndicate elections. The Brothers who received their political socialisation in this era were fundamentally different from their predecessors. Whilst the leadership is generally still dominated by the oldest generation of Brothers, it is this ‘second’ or ‘middle’ generation who act as representatives of the group as their spokesmen in parliament or on syndicate boards and have been working to generate new policies. These politically pragmatic second generation have increasingly joined forces with the shabaab (youth) wing of the organisation, highlighting the growing split between the new ‘moderate’ and liberal trend and the cautious conservatism of the ‘old-guard’.
The death of Mashur in 2002, followed by Al Hudaybi in 2004 marked the end of the domination of the old, suspicious and conservative generation, and paved the way for further moderate reform and innovation within the Brothers. Muhammad Mahdi Akef, then aged 76, was elected by a novel democratic system internally within the organisation, and has been rather more open to suggestions from younger members. For example, Akef was the driving force for the election of the moderate reformist Essam Al Erian to the Guidance Council – despite strong opposition from the ‘old guard’. Whilst internal divisions within the Muslim Brotherhood remain an important issue, the growing willingness to have an open dialogue over topics of contention suggest that the Brothers have adopted a new moderate, democratic approach within their own organisation.
One of the most significant developments in the organisational behaviour of the Muslim Brotherhood in the last decade has been the emergence of a section of young, outspoken and self-consciously ‘modern’ generation of politically active members. Shaped by the constrains of an autocratic regime with limited scope to express political opinions, growing numbers of political activists from a diverse range of ideological backgrounds have begun using internet blogs to share their ideas and create a sphere for debate and discussion. By the spring of 2007 there were over 150 Muslim Brothers blogging in cyberspace. Muhammad Hamza, a prolific blogging Brother, defined himself and his peers as the ‘2004 generation’, whose political identity had been shaped the information revolution of technology and cyberspace, and the appearance of Human Rights organisations, which raised awareness of the true extent of repression in Egyptian society.
This new ‘youth wing’ of the Muslim Brotherhood is characterised by political inclusiveness, open mindedness and a willingness to work with non-Islamist activists – as demonstrated in their rallying and networking in the January ‘revolution’. Although there have been notable precedents of alliances with ideological opponents, the independence of thought amongst the shabaab may prove something of a threat to the groups unity and the hegemony of the leadership. For example, one of the most prolific blogs, ‘Ana Ikhwan’ (I am the Brothers) by Abdal Munim Mahmoud, has been a prime example of the ‘new face’ of the Brothers. However, in April 2011 Mahmoud announced on his blog that he plans on beginning his own independent blog, and has decided to ‘freeze his membership of the Brothers’. The rise of these ‘blogging Brothers’ is a prime example of the ways of the ways in which the continuous patterns in challenges to the hegemony of the leadership are directly influenced by the external social and culture climate within Egypt.
In a clear attempt to reach out to the increasingly politicised and media-savvy Egyptian youth and perhaps help stem the growing internal divisions between moderates and conservatives within the organisation, the Brotherhood have recently launched the ‘Ikhwan Book’ – an online social networking site specifically aimed at uniting Islamic youth. Within the ‘aims’ published on the website, the Ikhwan Book states that it supports ‘moderate Islam’ and that it encourages ‘peaceful reform’.
Although the blogging Brothers’ represent a new, moderate trend within the movement, it should also be recognised that there careful to emphasise that there is also an opposing, conservative strand of Salafi-orientated youths, generally based in the provinces, away from the more liberal influences of Cairo or Alexandria. This Salafi sector has largely been concerned with purely religious and moral matters, leaving the politics to the urban centres; however, recent (alleged) Islamist attacks on gas pipelines in the Sinai Peninsula call for a renewed interest in the activities of the conservative relations of the newly ‘moderate’ Muslim Brotherhood.
The Muslim Brotherhood took a backseat during the January Revolution of 2011 that ousted Hosni Mubarak from power, declining from playing a prominent role in organisation or from encouraging the use of their Islamic slogans during the protests. This cautiousness seems to be a reflection of the Brotherhood’s attempts to prevent inflaming of western and secularist’s fears of a repeat of the Islamist conquest of the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Since January, the Brotherhood have been even more enthusiastic in presenting their organisation as a modern, moderate and democratic body – launching their ‘Freedom and Justice’ political party for the up-coming November elections, but stating they will contest less than half of the seats. This can be viewed either as a sign of their embracing of partisan politics, or, more cynically, as a ruse to alleviate liberalist fears of an Islamist takeover. Given the current split within the membership of the Brothers between moderates and conservative Salafis, either, or indeed both of these views may be to some extent true.
Although the rhetoric of the Muslim Brotherhood has undoubtedly expanded to include notions of democracy, pluralism, equal rights, many critics argue that this is contradicted by continued adherence to the idea of the Shariah as the primary source of law. Numerous high profile authors have been pessimistic regarding the potential for democracy in the Islamic world: Bernard Lewis has notoriously claimed that the historic confrontations with the West have left a simmering hostility to all aspects of perceived ‘western’ socio-political structures. Samuel Huntington argues that the emergence of democracy relies on a pre-existing complex of social values and institutions that are fundamentally lacking in the Middle East. However, recent events in the region have challenged this narrow vision of an indigenous inability to foster democracy – although, of course, only time will tell to what extent the uprisings achieve their democratic aims.
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