Who will replace him?
With the death of Colonel Muammar Gadaffi, international thoughts are inevitably turning towards the impending internal power struggle within the National Transitional Council . An obvious bi-product of an organised liberation fight is that the rewards must be shared, and thusLibya’s ethnic and tribal groups are actively seeking enhanced roles within the post-revolutionary society. There are real concerns that the removal of Gaddafi represents a chance for Islamist retribution, a chance for this suppressed group to take back what they have long been deprived of: prominence on the political stage. The military conflicts may be ending, but the political battle lines are just being mapped out, and the role of the Islamists and potential for a hard-line agenda is being viewed with increasing alarm.
The holding of governmental titles by Islamists will concern many inside and outsideTripoli, yet the process is already well underway. Abdel Hakkim Belhaj, a man known to have rejected democracy in the past, now holds the powerful position of leader of the Tripoli Military Council. Western intelligence services suspected Belhadj of having links to al-Qaeda, and it came as little surprise that his CIA-led capture in Bangkok in 2004 came after his flight from Afghanistan. A seven-year imprisonment and torture in one of Tripoli’s most notorious jails followed, and Belhadj’s demands for an apology from the West only heightens the feeling of lingering bad blood. “I couldn’t believe they could let this go on,” he said of British officials turning a blind-eye to his torture. “What has happened deserves a full inquiry.” Such obvious anger, coupled with alleged previous links to jihadist groups, means his prominent role attracts much concern.
Infighting already appears to be an issue within the nascent interim government. NTC chairman Mustafa Abdul Jibril does not wish to begin forming a new government until war is over, yet Islamists are becoming impatient. Prominent figures, such as the Qatar-based Islamist orator and cleric Ali al-Salabi have been expressing their discontent, denouncing Jibril and his allies as “extreme secularists” who seek to usher in “a new era of tyranny and dictatorship.” He will no doubt be pleased that Jibril left his post as intended once Sirte was taken by NTC fighters, having called for his resignation over a lack of weaponry being supplied to rebel forces. Al-Salabi’s outspoken comments illustrate a key problem facing post-revolutionaryLibya; that of an abundance of competing ideas and values.
The role of Islamists in Libya’s newly emergent political class contrasts sharply with their traditional unwillingness to adopt a public profile, leading to suggestions of opportunism. A lack of clarity over the nature and appeal of Islamist movements – there is no single organisation that dominates – makes their threat even harder to ascertain. Indeed, al-Salabi is seen as a voice of the more mainstream, political Islam espoused by the Muslim Brotherhood, forced underground by Col Gaddafi’s repression, but now gaining momentum following the dictator’s overthrow, and perhaps giving them an advantage in the impending political struggles. More worryingly, many Western officials believe that foreign benefactors supply the Islamists with arms, raising the possibility of a society riddled by revenge killings. The assassination of Gen. Abdul Fattah Younes remains, officially atleast, unaccounted for, although many suspect it to be the work of the Abu Obeida al-Jarrah Brigade – one of at least 30 Islamic militias operating in the east of the country, and working within the wider rebel movement.
Inconsistencies in Islamist rhetoric are also raising suspicions. Al-Salabi is suspected of harbouring a deep mistrust of the US. His clashes with Jibril may stem partly from the latter’s US-education, also believed to be a reason why al-Salabi dislikes Ali Tarhouni, a US economics professor who left Libya in the 1970s and is now the Finance and Oil Minister.
Mutual suspicions between the hard-line religious factions and more moderate secularists appear to be coming to the fore, and this seems only counterproductive for Libya in the long term. Fathi Ben Issa left his seat on the Tripoli Municipal Governing Council after becoming uneasy over alleged Islamist plans to ban theatres and certain art forms, as well as preventing women from driving. He claims al-Salabi is “hiding his intentions…saying one thing to the BBC and another to Al Jazeera.”
However, Islamist motives require closer inspection, within a broader, historical context. The now defunct Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), co-founded by Abdel Hakim Belhaj in 1990 and which aimed to set up a hard-line Islamic state within Libya, allegedly tried to assassinate Gaddafi at least once in the mid-1990s. Although the group became obsolete in 1998 their desire to end Gaddafi’s tyrannical rule was both longstanding and entirely genuine. Islamist desire to reject autocracy could provide a strong base for the NTC moving forward; acting almost as insurance that history will not repeat itself, and that power-sharing will become a feature of Libyan society.
Even al-Salabi admits that rebuilding Libyawill be the job of the people, and all will “have the right to offer their proposals and programs, and if the people choose them I have no problem.” Such public declarations of liberalism – “We believe in democracy” – may mask more hard-line desires, yet optimism isn’t merely confined to within Libya. Even senior USfigures feel Islamist agendas cannot prevail. Jeffrey D. Feltman, assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern affairs, insists he “isn’t concerned that one group is going to be able to dominate the aftermath of what has been a shared struggle by the Libyan people.”
There now seems to be a limit as to how far the Islamists can go. They do not attract widespread support, with ordinary Libyans feeling that their ‘tunnel-vision’ is not the best way to achieve democratic pluralism. The precedent for protest has been set, and if the Islamists began to gain too much influence,Libya’s long-suffering people could well take to the streets once again. Millions of ordinary citizens have not risked their social and political livelihoods to the Gadaffi regime, only to see political oppression return under a different heading.
Despite being a conservative religious state, most Libyans do not seek hard-line Islamic governance. Jibril said Libyan law would be based partly on Islamic law, but this is not new; Libya’s first constitution was based on Islamic law, and Gaddafi’s government also recognised certain aspects. A homogeneous, urbanised country, with an educated middle class, Libyais aware of the perils of extremism. They are unwilling to abandon their Islamic culture but even more reluctant to become an Islamic state. “There is no need for that [secularism] here. What would be the point when all Libyans are Muslims?” one man in Tripoli said.
There are certainly legitimate concerns around which political direction Libya will take. Power-sharing amongst the power hungry will not be easy, and Islamist rhetoric is unlikely to completely mirror their true motives. Yet, the political role of prominent Islamists need not be viewed with excessive scepticism; it is the ordinary Libyans, emboldened and optimistic, who will decide their country’s future. Indeed, the ultimate irony is that while many eagerly proclaim a new democratic beginning after almost half a century of dictatorship, few in Libya actually know where to begin.
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