Detainees from Libya’s war against supporters of the late dictator are reportedly facing torture in their thousands as the provisional NTC government endeavours to assert its authority. United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay has expressed extreme concern for the fate of these detainees, urging the NTC to bring these detention centres under the authority of the justice ministry and general prosecutors office, granting them a fair trial. However, Libya’s provisional government is struggling, attempting to wrestle control of the country from increasingly belligerent fighters while simultaneously grappling with its own legitimacy.

This could be the failure of the irresponsible few to maintain the values of the revolution; but perhaps this is the first sign of significant retributive activity in the aftermath of successful 2011-2012 uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa- perhaps it presents us with a forecast for the future of other nations in similar situations, and serves as a warning to all those involved in political activity in the region, both domestically and internationally.

The overwhelming power of the majority, and the consequential marginalisation of the minority, has been a perennial flaw in democratic theory since its inception, but it is particularly prevalent in post-revolutionised countries. Once those in power are ousted, they become the new heretics, vilified as the minority who propped up the old regime. One can argue that the unity of the majority is a useful platform for a functional representative governance because shared values and aspirations can promote a country’s progress, but when it is a unity forged by a common enemy, power becomes a tyranny of the masses rather than a just all-inclusive democracy.

Without mitigation, revenge against the new heretics in political vacuity can lead not only to abuses of human rights in a temporary transitional phase, but to the replacement of one totalitarian state with another. A society fired up by the fervour of change, intent on reintroducing national and religious values to a country starved of it under repressive and foreign ideologies, and resistant to the anomie of Western liberal capitalism, is likely to reduce freedom of the individual to a system where individuality is attained only through association with the community; a unity forged by a common domestic enemy will lead to retributive persecution and the formulation of a polity which prevents intellectual freedom and ultimately, democracy.

This sort of fragmented, seemingly uncontrollable retribution is a frequent outcome of revolutionary and rapid regime change. In the midst of the chaos of the uprising, and the resulting absence of authority, activists taste independence from any form of governance. In lieu of any strong, central command, local strongholds and militias are necessarily formed, and vigilante justice takes  hold. This is the gritty reality of not only creating structures and processes that, prior to revolution, did not exist, but also reviving societal cohesion following the turmoil and trauma of the Arab Spring.

In Libya, reports are emerging of an estimated 8000 pro-Gaddafi supporters being held in secret detention centres by revolutionary militias, still independent of any central governing force. Several people died from torture, and ‘Medecins Sans Frontieres has suspended operations in Misrata after treating 115 patients with torture-related wounds’. With armed gangs yet an ever-present force in Libya, and the interim National Transitional Council unable to exert authority or control over them, the stage is set for vengeful eradication of what is left of Gaddafi’s loyalists, a classification often decided by whoever is wielding weapons.

In Syria, political violence has already gripped Homs and may well spread further across the country. Bashar al-Assad’s highly militarised security regime, and all who support it, have become demonised as opponents to the dignity of the country and people of Syria. The problem there is that political violence is appearing along religious lines- the Alawite community’s emergence into the political infrastructure during Hafez al-Assad’s rule has caused tensions between the Sunni majority and the Alawite minority which are based on a resentment felt towards the government, rather than the differences in theology. But many of the new heretics in Syria’s case are Alawites, and retributive violence could turn from political to sectarian in motivation if stability is not regained quickly. Many consider sectarianism in Syria to be a fallacy generated by mendacious governmental propaganda which portrays activists as Islamic terrorists and designed to frighten non-Muslim minorities into submission and loyalty to the regime. But again, retributive violence might be only one dimension of the problem- Islam might be utilised in uniting the majority against the minority.

Crisis Project asked London-based Syrians what they wanted from a new Syria- the answer was almost unanimously: whatever the people decide they want. However, this is democracy in its simplest form- rather than stimulated and reasoned debate in the public sphere for the purposes of accountable governance, ‘democracy’ is limited to language and nothing more. And when asked about the role of Islam in a new Syrian politics, many answered that the majority of Syrians were Muslims, so the new politics must reflect that. To be clear, Islam can be conflated with democracy and individual liberty can be promoted through Islamic values. But depending on the most preferred Islamic intelligentsia in a country, political Islam is also capable of restricting certain voices and preventing open debate.

The problem may well arise in Egypt too. Although retributive violence is unlikely, there seems to be a gap between the word or notion of ‘democracy’ and the implementation of a representative governance. Article 3 of the 2011 Provisional Egyptian Constitution ‘sovereignty is from the people only’ but Article 56 gives all administrative control to the military. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces are due to step down after the Presidential elections in July and will be handing over authority to a lower house occupied largely by the ‘Freedom and Justice Party’ (The Muslim Brotherhood) and the ‘Al-Nour’ Party (Salafists). It will be interesting to see how the constitution is changed and who gains control of interpreting the Quran- this will determine how far the rule of law is based on a particular identity and how those excluded from that community are perceived.

Action must be taken now across the Middle East and North Africa to prevent the revolutions creating a renewed tyranny of the masses. Retributive violence can take place in the chaos of the immediate aftermath- provisional government bodies such as the Syrian National Council need to plan how members of the old regime will be dealt with if the government falls. Further, the institutionalisation of  polities defined by the interests and identity of the majority, disregarding the rights of minorities, is a distinct possibility if provisional government bodies do not substantiate the calls for ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’. The international community should also provide assistance wherever it is needed and wanted because retributive violence will have transnational as well as national implications and future governments and citizens will suffer as a result.

By Luke Errington-Barnes and Michael Everard, 27/01/2012

List of demands by protestors including the end to the state of emergency

Egypt has suffered under the continuous State of Emergency Law since 1980 when it was brought in after the assassination of President Anwar Sadat. And so the news that Field Marshal Tantawi announced he would “end the state of emergency starting on the morning of January 25, 2012″ sounded as if it was another step in the right direction for Egypt’s transition to a functioning democracy.

Under Egypt’s state of emergency, Hosni Mubarak was able to extend the powers of the police, suspend the constitutional rights of Egyptian citizens, block any non-governmental political activity and legalise censorship. This period of emergency law thus contributed to the detainment of 30,000 political prisoners who the state was able to hold indefinitely without trial as well as contributing to Mubarak’s ability to maintain authoritarian control over the state and impede the development of the political sphere.

It therefore came as no surprise to many that one of the key demands of the Egyptian opposition and revolutionary movements, from the outset of the uprising, was the end to the state of emergency. Under immense public pressure, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and Tantawi, as its head, promised to end emergency rule back in February 2011 but then reneged on its promise 6 months later by expanding the remit of the law.

With large demonstrations and increasing public anger at the ongoing failure for power to be transferred to a civilian government, SCAF has had to act. However, when Tantawi proceeded to say that emergency law would still apply in cases of “thuggery”, it became clear to see that Egypt’s path to democracy remains a rocky one. With no clear definition of what “thuggery” entails and no definitive end to emergency rule in its entirety, peaceful yet politically active Egyptians remain vulnerable to the draconian laws of the leader they managed to begin to oust a year ago today.

The power the military, and in particular Tantawi, continue to hold onto remains a significant issue amongst the new generation of elected MP’s with Abul Ezz el-Hariri of the Revolution Continues coalition stating “the head of the SCAF should be in prison now.”As one of the most powerful arms of the state, the military was instrumental in propping up Mubarak’s dictatorship with Tantawi being infamous for being Mubarak’s loyal defence minister for 20 years. The military issue seems unlikely to be resolved in the immediate future with presidential elections unlikely to be held before June and the constitution yet to be rewritten although the military has promised to return to its barracks once a president is elected. Given the military’s past record when it comes to promises, this remains to be seen.

Islamists sweep the board in Egyptian elections

As the MPs pledged their loyalty to serve the Egyptian nation in the newly elected Parliament on Monday (23^rd January), almost a year to the day since the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak, political divisions and cracks were already beginning to show. A number of parliamentarians added their own personal flourishes to the scripted oaths, beginning with the Salafi Mahmoud Ismail, who chose to add “if not in contradiction with God’s doctrine” onto the end of his oath. Others chose to wear distinctive yellow armbands stating “no to military trials”, making clear their opposition to the continuing repressive tactics of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). Meanwhile, a significant number of anti-military junta protesters were lined-up outside the parliamentary gates, highlighting the fact that for many Egyptians, the ‘revolution’ of January last year continues to be an ongoing process.

This first attempt at a democratic election for the Egyptian Parliament since the 2011 overthrow of Mubarak has resulted in a decisive victory for the Islamist parties, gaining 67% of the total. The Muslim Brotherhood’s ‘Freedom and Justice Party’ achieved the highest proportion of votes, 38%, whilst the more conservative Islamist Salafi ‘Al Nour’ party gained an impressive 29%. They were followed by the liberal ‘New Wafd’ and ‘Egyptian Bloc’, coming third and fourth respectively. The ‘Revolution Continues’ party, largely composed of the young activists who were at the forefront of the January protests, took less than a million votes, which translated into a disappointing 7 seats.

The triumph of the Muslim Brotherhood in the elections is clear evidence of their success in harnessing support amongst the Egyptian public, a result of having spent over eighty years embedding themselves deep within local communities through social welfare and education schemes. The Muslim Brotherhood are undoubtedly the best-known socio-political organisation in Egypt, and have been able to capitalise on both their pre-existing support base, as well as the failures of the liberal opposition to effectively organise and lobby public support. The success of the Muslim Brotherhood in the elections, alongside these long-standing social welfare efforts, has been their achievements in adapting to the contemporary political climate, and harnessing the support of youth activists through social media.

As well as the disappointing results for the liberal parties in the Parliamentary election, the recent withdrawal of the internationally well-known liberal Mohammed El Baradei from the Presidential election campaign has come as a further blow to those hoping for the new regime to take on a moderate and secular slant. El Baradei blamed the continuing repressive and undemocratic tactics of SCAF for his decision, stating “my conscience does not permit me to run for the presidency or any other official position unless it is within a democratic framework.”

Whilst the Muslim Brotherhood certainly appear to be on the brink of taking power due to their majority in the parliamentary assembly, it is important to note that the President retains the power to choose the government, and the Brotherhood have chosen not to run a candidate for the Presidency. The elections for the Presidency are due to take place this June, and the outcome may have an important influence over the balance of political power. However, the Muslim Brotherhood’s majority means they have been able to name one of their candidates, Saad Al Katatni, as the parliamentary speaker, giving them an indisputably strong influence over government proceedings and the writing of the new Egyptian constitution.

“I have not seen a real bastard than you. i wish somebody comes and strip you naked. i hope some Army man has not done real dirty with your dear ones.”

The text was followed by a flurry of messages declaring Mir, one of Pakistan’s most prominent journalists, a RAW, CIA and Mossad agent. According to him, the messages came from intelligence agencies, a treatment he claims happens every time his show casts the military in an unfavourable light, saying “I am sure that security establishment of Pakistan is once again angry with all those who will raise questions about the political role of Army.” Mir warned that “if anything bad happens with me or my “dear ones” the security establishment will be responsible”.

Hamid Mir’s experiences are emblematic of the harsh adversities faced by journalists in Pakistan, ranging from threats and intimidation to collateral and targeted killings. This year the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) declared Pakistan as the world’s deadliest country for journalists, with 7 media personnel killed in the line of duty in 2011. Among the victims was Asia Times reporter Saleem Shehzad, who was abducted by unidentified people a day after he wrote a piece claiming that the militant attack on a naval base in Karachi was orchestrated with the help of radical elements within the Pakistan Navy. The next day, his corpse was found on the roadside of a remote village. He had been tortured to death.

As in the case of Hamid Mir, fingers have been pointed towards Pakistan’s intelligence agencies. Though the agencies and the military’s Inter Services Public Relations have denied any involvement, it has done little to dispel the notion that they are heavily engaged in monitoring or harassing journalists who try to present views against the military or political establishment. There is little done to find out the truth behind these activities. According to CPJ statistics, complete impunity exists in 95 percent of the cases of murdered journalists.

In a country like Pakistan where the public perceives little accountability towards the country’s rulers, the fledgling broadcast media has assumed a position as a surrogate accountability system, regularly reporting on corruption scandals or other crimes committed by the powers-that-be. It is widely perceived as a normative force, exemplified in its involvement in the movement to restore democratic rule in Pakistan. Such actions have made the public incredibly supportive of the media, but also earned them the ire of the establishment. It is commonly perceived that the security threats to journalists stem from working in conflict zones. But CPJ statistics have revealed that 53 percent of them were covering political beats, mostly in metropolitan areas.

The numerous threats faced by journalists have made it extremely difficult to report impartially and objectively, especially when the revelations threaten the status quo. Such actions towards the media do not just have a major impact on journalists, but also threaten the central pillar of the democratic state: Freedom of speech. If the practitioners of this freedom are facing death threats, what can one say about democracy in Pakistan?

The controversy stems from an unsigned memo warning Washington of a possible coup by the military following the Osama Bin Laden raid in May, and urging the Obama Administration to assist the civilian government in countering such threats.

The memo and its contents were revealed by Pakistani-American businessman Mansoor Ejaz in an op-ed in the Financial Times in October, where he claimed that the memo was sent at the behest of Pakistan’s Ambassador to the US Hussain Haqqani, conveying a message that came directly from President Asif Ali Zardari.

Islamabad has vehemently denied its complicity in the memo, but that hasn’t halted the storm. Ambassador Haqqani tendered his resignation soon after the scandal broke out, while the President departed to the UAE citing health reasons after suffering a ‘mini-stroke’. Political pundits have seen the developments as a reaction to the military’s furious response to the document, demanding that the Supreme Court investigate the matter. The Army Chief Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani and Director General of the ISI Lt. Gen. Ahmad Shuja Pasha have urged the court to investigate the origins of the memo. There has even been talk of bringing up charges of high treason against the author of the document.  Meanwhile the ruling Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) has engaged in PR battle as well, labelling the scandal as a conspiracy to destabilize the government, and have stated that there is no legal precedent to investigate the case at the highest level, a comment that has earned the ire of Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry. The Supreme Court has harshly rebuked the government’s insistence that the case does not merit an inquiry, and urged the President to respond to the allegations. Chief Justice Chaudhry even went so far as to state that the President’s refusal to answer could be seen as evidence of guilt.  Opposition leaders have capitalized on the controversy, demanding fresh elections on the pretext of the government’s continued failures.

The existence of the memo and its backlash has resulted in a puzzled reaction from Washington. After a muted response, former Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen acknowledged that he had received the memo, but gave no importance to it. On the other hand, former National Security Advisor James L. Jones claimed that the memo was entirely written by Mansur Ejaz and that Haqqani had no role to play in it, a statement that is sure to help the former Ambassador as he strives to clear his name in the courts.

Talks of an institutional clash involving the army, the judiciary, and the government, have taken centre stage in Islamabad, and resulted in a flurry of rumours, including the prospect of an imminent military takeover. Last week, several noted politicians, including former Information Minister Sheikh Rashid, had even predicted that President Zardari would never come back, as his departure was the initial stage for the coup. Such speculations were put to rest after the President returned earlier this week. However, the political grapevine has continued to flourish, with Punjab Law Minister Rana Sanaullah stating that Zardari’s comeback was the result of a backdoor deal with the military.

The possibility of such an agreement was played up by the PPP government, after a meeting between Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani and the Army Chief on the weekend, which also included a telephone conversation between Gen. Kayani and President Zardari. Following the meeting, the Prime Minister declared that the controversy was put to rest, and that there was no need to investigate the issue, implying that a deal had been struck with the Army Chief. However, the military has made no such indications that it will back off from its stance, and continues to demand a proper investigation.

Such mixed signals have left the situation even murkier, and with no clarification in sight, all eyes are on the Supreme Court as the case resumes its hearing on Thursday.

F-16 IN RECONNAISSANCE OVER THE DESERT

NATO free-hand in the former Libyan Jamahiriya (1977-2011) marked the culmination of a series of duel-tier interventions designed to safeguard civilian populations and stabilise the international climate. Comprising Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2003) and now Libya (2011), the alliance has expanded its security coverage over an array of state and sub-state elements as part of an overhaul of its raison d’état in the aftermath of the liquidation of the Soviet Union. Though the morality of the NATO-spearheaded intervention cannot be contested, its legality has been subject to controversy. Mainstream international law (ius inter gentes) sanctioned the use of ‘all necessary measures’ (via Chapter VII Security Council Resolution S/RES/1973) to safeguard civilians. As the Security Council effectively monopolises the legal use of force, the Resolution suffices as a legal basis for the intervention. Yet there is a substantive conflict with humanitarian intervention and a fundamental legal contour in international law; that of sovereignty. Both sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention form an integral part of customary international law (ius gentium). Reconciling this contradiction will not only enhance the saliency of humanitarian intervention for the future but also alleviate fears that NATO has contravened its international obligations.

NATO alignment in favour of the Benghazi rebels (and their political counterpart the National Transitional Council) in lieu of neutrality was viewed by many as incompatible with international law. Both the African Union and several Libyan tribal myriads encompassing the Magarha, Qaddafha and Warfallah, expressed indignation for NATO’s manoeuvres, in what they considered essentially a neo-colonial enterprise (1). The notion that intervention is illegal is founded, inter alia, on the seminal case of Nicaragua 1984, where the ICJ held that the ‘United States of America, by training, arming, equipping, financing and supplying the contra forces or otherwise encouraging, supporting and aiding military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua, has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to intervene in the affairs of another State’ (2). Supplanting Nicaragua for Libya and the Contras for the Libyan rebels, it appears that prima facie, favouring the centripetal insurrection was a customary legal breach both as it vitiated Libyan territorial integrity and selectively favoured the rebels over the general population. This is aggravated by the fact that general intervention is proscribed both by article 2(7) of the UN Charter and provisions of the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation between States, which NATO states are party to (3).  Notwithstanding allegations of arms ferrying to the rebels (in breach of the arms embargo) and deployment of troops,(in breach of the no foreign occupation forces provision), it appears that at first sight,  NATO sorties were de facto incompatible with the non-intervention norm and thereby in conflict with customary international law.

However, customary international law is saturated with lacuna conferring substantial latitude to circumvent the norm and thereby allay NATO’s legal standing. In the same case an, the ICJ stipulated that “[r]eliance by a State on a novel right or an unprecedented exception to the principle [such as humanitarian intervention] might, if shared in principle by other States, tend towards a modification of customary international law’ (4). S/RES/1976 was not vetoed d was entertained by the BRIC Group and Germany with quiescence. In the context of international law, neutrality of this nature is interpreted as a passive form of consent. The ICJ further intimated that intervention by a coalition of states in contravention of the norm of non-intervention could only be justified if there was a “reference to a new right of intervention or a new exception to the principle of its prohibition.” This ‘new right of intervention’ is the R2P mechanism (Responsibility to Protect) inaugurated by the 2005 World Summit and that formed the normative framework of S/RES/1976 that authorised NATO’s feat accompli in the Maghreb. Similarly, objections levied by the African Union against intervention hold no legal effect as it was the very same organisation that endorsed the R2P mechanism in 2005 during the Ezulwini Consensus. Thus, though customary international law would traditionally uphold the 1648 Westphalian formula, the combination of unique circumstance (the Arab Spring) and neutrality by third-party states, coupled with the capability to inculcate humanitarian intervention into international law, overrides the non-intervention norm and expiates NATO’s action.

Even from a theoretical vantage, the intervention in Libya was commensurate with Chapter VII rationale to “restore international peace and security” (5). One of the preliminary articles proposed by Kant for perpetual peace is that “No state shall by force interfere with the constitution or government of another State’ (6)-a necessary contour to sustain amity in the international comity and a source of inspiration for the UN. However Kant places a caveat to his own article that is fruitful in vindicating NATO partisanship- ‘But it would be quite different if a state, by internal rebellion, should fall into two parts each of which pretended to be a separate state making claim to the whole. To lend assistance to one of these cannot be considered an interference in the constitution of the other state (for it is then in a state of anarchy)’ (7). By this token, favouring the NTC was legitimate. NATO intervention was initiated on the 19 March 2011, only after the Benghazi-based NTC had issued a statement (5 March 2011) declaring itself to be the “only legitimate body representing the people of Libya and the Libyan state” (8). As the Libyan state had effectively lapsed into two competing factions (originally Benghazi-Tripoli then Benghazi-Sirte), NATO alignment in favour of the rebels conformed even to Kantian ideals.

Having thus harmonised humanitarian intervention with international law, it is imperative to highlight potential side-effects. Customary international law is liable to sensitive dependence on initial conditions (the butterfly effect). Acclimatising states to novel norms of this nature may subsequently jeopardise global security if founded on miscellaneous grounds and emulated with less bona fide intent for private ends (lucri causa) under the pretext of humanitarian intervention. This notion, supported by the FCO in 1986, is still valid today-“contemporary legal opinion comes down against the existence of a right of humanitarian intervention/ on prudential grounds that the scope for abusing such a right argues strongly against its creation’. (9) Similarly, the fusion of humanitarian sensibility with the use of force can lead to the sublimation of international aggression. Sublimation is a psychological phenomenon whereby one renders one’s natural impulses and instincts into socially acceptable outcomes. This has a multitude of tangible benefits for NATO as a military alliance but can have a malign effect on general interstate interface. Due to the expiration of its original purpose, NATO is in need of a rationale to revitalize and support its military outlook. By associating NATO action with humanitarian action it renders its continued existence more palatable to its citizens, placating the democratic and liberal contours it was founded on during the 1949 Washington Treaty. However, affiliating in this fashion can also distort the true nature of interstate violence. Caution is therefore necessary in ensuring that humanitarian intervention is not used as a pretext for aggrandisement and as a smokescreen concealing the genuine nature of international force.

The Libyan intervention has blurred the Mogadishu line, the subtle delimitation between diplomacy (such as the no fly-zone), war (NATO air strikes) and international law. But unlike domestic law whose provisions are stable, international law is labile and capable of habituating humanitarian intervention. The sedition in Libya was not only an opportunity for NATO to redeem itself, but also the opportunity to foment the seeds of a new legality, one that would place conditions on sovereignty and modify the status quo. But the success of future humanitarian intervention and in particular, the R2P mechanism, is contingent on end-user felicity.  Only time will tell if humanitarian intervention was fruitful in Libya and if it will eventually evolve into a full-fledged legal contour.

BY RAYMOND ABOU-MANSOUR [PELECANOS] FOR TRANSNATIONAL CRISIS PROJECT

FOOT NOTES -

(1) An encyclical was published by a Warfalla headed- Libyan Tribal Council on the 26 July 2011 condemning NATO action. Retrieved from http://www.afrik53.com/Libye-manifeste-du-Conseil-Tribal-Libyen_a6094.html (in french)

(2) The principle of non-intervention is also supported by UNSC Resolution 2131 (XX) 1965, containing the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and augmented by Resolutions 31/91 of 14 December 1976, 32/153 of 19 December 1977, 33/74 of 15 December 1978, 34/101 of 14 December 1979 and 35/159 of 12 December 1980 on non-interference in the internal affairs of States.

(3) Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 1984 ICJ REP. 392 June 27, 1986.

(4) Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 1984 ICJ REP. 392 June 27, 1986.

(5) http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml

(6) Kant, Immanouel,  1795 essay, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch” (Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf).

(7) Kant, Immanouel,  1795 essay, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch” (Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf).

(8) The Interim Transitional National Council Decree 3, published 5 March 2011 Retrived from http://www.ntclibya.org/english/founding-statement-of-the-interim-transitional-national-council/

(9) United Kingdom Foreign Office, Pol’y Doc. No. 148, reprintedin 1986 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 614,619

The lights are on but is anyone home?

In light of UK Prime Minister David Cameron’s “Up yours, Delores” last week, how isolated is the UK in Europe? The Guardian newspaper would have us believe that this is literally the end of the world. The UK isn’t a member of the Euro, to which we can thank former PM Gordon Brown, possibly the only good thing he ever did. Why the UK should have any role in how a foreign currency is administrated is beyond this author. The UK is still in the EU, indeed nothing has changed since Cameron’s decision to go it alone. The only momentous part is that a European leader actually had the gall to say no to the extension of the EU gravy train. Could it be that rather than help rearrange the furniture as the Euro ship sinks, Cameron decided instead to leap in the first lifeboat. He’s already seen Greece effectively drowned by its so-called mates France and Germany. He probably thought, ‘I’m not even in this club, why hang around’.

All year The Economist has warned that Europe’s piss-poor attempts to prop up the Euro have been heading for disaster, crippled as they have been by France’s President Sarkozy and Germany’s PM Merkel who have domestic agendas to deal with, and an intransigent European Central Bank (ECB) refusing to be seen as lender of last resort as far as sovereign debt is concerned. The ECB only agreed this month to provide a safety net for European banks which, considering the current Euro crisis started in the summer, is a glacial approach. Even so, European inter-bank lending is drying up as it did following the collapse of Lehmans in 2008, a sixth of all deposits have been withdrawn  from Greek banks and Greece is effectively bankrupt, though the bunker mentality in Brussels would have you think otherwise. These are hardly makers of confidence that there is any plan to lift the Euro from its woes. So much for the summit to end all summits.

Medvedev and Assad in 2010

From the outset of the uprising in Syria, Russia has taken a dispassionate and often confounding stance towards the civil unrest and continued bloodshed. It has remained staunchly against sanctions aimed at debilitating the vehement Assad government, and filibustered countless efforts by the UN and other international bodies to castigate the violence, often to the dismay of Western diplomats. As a result, Syrian protesters have publicly burned the Russian flag in fury at Moscow’s hindrance. The reasoning behind this obstruction lies in Russia’s history with Syria, and its current vested interests in the Syrian regime.

Russian political maneuvers during the Syrian uprising

At the beginning of October, Russia was beginning to make its intentions known with regard to Syria when it vetoed a UN resolution condemning the regime. The US was outraged by this move, not least because the resolution itself had already been diluted a number of times to remove direct references to sanctions, instead referring to them as ‘targeted measures’. Russia’s ambassador to the UN, Vitaly Churkin, argued that the resolution, and the UN’s attitude towards Syria, was based on the “philosophy of confrontation”. Churkin attested that NATO misused a previous UN measure authorising the use of force to protect civilians in Libya to justify months of air strikes and to promote regime change. The most Russia was willing to concede was that Bashar’s administration should be quicker with implementing promised changes.

The United Nations did eventually, over a month later, manage to pass a resolution condemning Syria’s crackdown on opposition protests across the country. However to attain this result, the resolution had to be forced through the UN Human Rights Committee, in which no country holds the contentious veto power. The motion passed through the Human Rights Committee contained no mention of sanctions, only verbal censure, and still Russia abstained from voting in the Committee.

On 17^th November, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed unequivocally that Russia was against Assad’s removal, as this would allegedly destroy an Arab League initiative that called for dialogue between the government and its foes. This claim appears incongruous when one considers that if Assad had stepped down, there would have been no need for the Arab League initiative in the first place.

On 18^th November words became actions when Russian warships were reported to have entered Syrian waters. Numerous observers claimed this was undoubtedly part of a bid to ward off foreign intervention into Syria. The move, to the vocal West, represented a stark message that Russia opposed international interference in the embattled regime’s affairs, surely a contradictory message given the presence of Russian armaments around Syria. To that effect, claims began to arise that Russia had armed Syria with weapons to defend itself against any NATO-masterminded intervention.

Despite these perhaps overblown allegations, one Syrian official boasted that “Russia is our political shield.” This might be seen as part of the Syrian regime’s desire to project itself as protected under a Russian military umbrella; however in reality the movement of Russian warships is better understood in the broader context of current Russian disputes with the US and NATO over the latter’s impingement on the former’s traditional zones of influence via its proposed European missile defence system.

Nevertheless, the Russian government further strengthened its ties with the repressive Syrian regime in late-November when it, along with Iran, China and India, lined up vessels for the purchase of Syrian oil. This move ran counter to multiple US and EU sanctions on the purchase of Syrian resources, including an import ban on the country’s oil imposed in September. While traditional buyers had been warded off, Russia moved to continue pouring money into the pockets of a regime that has otherwise been disconnected from the international community.

Equally, Russia’s purchases from Syria have the capability to undermine Arab League economic sanctions that were approved on the 27^th November. Sanctions included cutting off transactions with the Syrian central bank, suspending Arab government funding for projects in Syria and freezing government assets.

The central explanations for what can be termed at best Russia’s ambivalence towards Assad’s government find their roots in the two countries’ historical relations, as well as a number of Russian vested interests in Syria that are under threat in the current uprising. Thus the former super power sees the fall of Assad as parallel to a diminishing of its influence in Syria, in turn affecting its presence in the region as a whole.

The development of Russian interests in Syria

A crucial factor in the context of the current Syrian revolt is an arms deal made between Russia and Syria in May of 2010. Russia signed agreements confirming its supply of MiG-29 (Fulcrum) fighters and truck-mounted Pantsir (SA-22) surface-to-air missiles as well as anti-aircraft artillery systems to Syria. The amounts of capital involved in this deal were not elaborated upon, however, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s visit to Damascus was the first of its kind by a Russian national leader.

Naturally, this arms deal forms a commitment between Medvedev and Assad, hence Russia sees the latter’s fall as commensurate with the loss of this income source. This is particularly credible as any successive government in Syria would likely be mindful of Russia’s benign behaviour towards its predecessor.

In August this year, as testimony to the aforementioned deal, Russia’s top arms exporter, Rosoboronexport, confirmed that it would continue its sale of weapons to Syria. This development came despite pleas from Israel to reconsider its ongoing arms trade with Syria, fearing that such weapons could fall into the hands of Hezbollah. Russia, it seems, wishes to play both sides of the field, rhetorically supporting Israel while arming one of its most fervent critics. More recent agreements have in fact reinforced previous trading. Russia will soon be selling its Yak-130 light attack fighter planes to Assad’s army.

Accordingly, trade in arms between Russia and Syria linked to this deal and beyond have in actuality soared to new heights in 2011. Anatoly Isaykin, general director of Rosoboronexport, states he expects to make deliveries on at least $9 billion worth of arms globally, an increase on last year’s sales of around $8.6 billion. Isaykin’s impetus behind bolstering weapons trade with Syria is the $4 billion of contracts lost when the United Nations instituted an arms embargo on Libya earlier this year. Although this figure may be an overstatement of the amount of  money that could prospectively have been made from Libya through weapons trade, Isaykin was quoted as saying “Naturally we are trying to compensate for the losses we saw due to the events of North Africa”. It seems financial interests perpetually undermine humanitarian concerns, as affirmed by US envoy to the UN Susan Rice, who stated that Russia would “rather sell arms to the Syrian regime than stand with the Syrian people.”

Mutual ties, however, can be traced back further than recent transactions. Notwithstanding contemporary arms trade and wider Russo-Syrian relations, the history between the two states over the past decades also serves to shed some light on Russia’s current demeanour towards Syria.

As the USSR, Russia played a key role in the development of Syria’s economy, building numerous industrial facilities and other infrastructural projects. Around a third of Syria’s electric power capacity and oil-processing facilities as well as irrigation services were assisted in their construction by Soviet cooperation with Damascus. The two countries have fostered economic ties and worked together towards greater economic liberalisation. However these projects created large sums of debt, which had a profound effect on the two’s relationship.

As such, Russo-Syrian relations during the contentious Putin era remained relatively sour until one intriguing meeting between Vladimir Putin and Bashar al-Assad in January of 2005. Following this meeting in Moscow, relations seemed to improve dramatically. A personal connection was made between Assad and Putin; however the reasons for this increase in cooperation belie a mere friendly handshake.

To understand the foundation of the cooperation following the 2005 meeting, one must look back to an earlier liaison, this time when Syria was under the control of Bashar’s father, Hafez. In July of 1999, a few months before Putin would rise to presidency in Russia, long-time Syrian dictator Hafez al-Assad paid a visit to Russia that would be his last. At this time, Damascus still owed Moscow a large amount of Soviet-era debt amounting to as much as $12 billion; this debt would become the focus of the meeting. Katz (2006) has noted three reasons for Moscow’s desire for genial relations with Damascus at this time, despite the looming debt. Primarily, Russia saw itself in particular as capable of pushing Syria toward peace with Israel. Secondly, Tartus on the Syrian coast was the location of Russia’s only naval base in the Mediterranean, and finally Damascus was prepared to pay unrestricted cash to Russia for the upgrade of its old Soviet weapons and the import of new Russian arms.

A loose deal was made at this time that envisioned Russia releasing pressure on Syria to repay its debts in return for becoming a long-term customer of Russian weaponry. However, despite this deal’s inception in 1999, it would not become a reality until the meeting of January 2005. It was at this meeting that it was announced that Moscow had agreed to write off 73 percent of Syria’s then $13.4 billion debt to Russia. In addition, naturally, Russia would be selling Damascus the Strelets air defence launcher units, developed for use with SA-18 and SA-16 missiles. Following this meeting, relations were bound to path-dependency with regards to arms purchases in exchange for debt lenience. This arrangement is still manifesting itself to this day. The 2008 agreement that the base at Tartus be developed and modernized over the coming years, the arms deal of May 2010 and current transactions as well as Russia’s support for Syria more generally is a continuation of previous events over the past decades.

This deepening of relations between the two countries continued with the advent of Russian oil explorations throughout Syria, as well as Russian oil companies such as Tatneft and Stroytransgaz building gas processing plants, oil refineries and petrochemical complexes within Syrian territory.

Throughout this cooperation, Syria nurtured a natural incentive and compulsion to turn to Moscow in its times of need, an advantageous development for Moscow, who now has Damascus precisely where it wants it. The combination of a heightened sense of insecurity on the part of the Syrians and increasing isolation from the West has endowed Russian arms and petroleum industries with unprecedented access to the Syrian polity.

Further, such assertions are supported by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) Trend Indicator Values of arms exports to Syria. SIPRI’s database indicates that between 2005 and 2010, Russian arms exports to Syria increased from $7 million in 2005 to $162 million in 2010. Such a stark increase follows the assertion that ties between the two countries were solidified in January of 2005.

One final factor that deserves consideration is the deteriorating relationship between Russia and US-led NATO more generally through current disputes over the United States’ and NATO’s proposed European missile defence system. Russia sees this system as detrimental to its interests and influence in the region, and counterproductive to what they have called the ‘strategic nuclear balance’. As a result, on November 23^rd President Medvedev asked the Defence Ministry to put the missile attack early warning station in Kaliningrad on combat alert. Couple this hawkish posturing with Syria and Russia’s mutual distain for US hegemony and one might feasibly contend that Syria is simply another component in this wider disintegration of East-West relations.

To conclude, Russia’s obstruction of coherent condemnation in regard to Assad’s handling of nationwide rebellion, and enhancing of ties with the Syrian regime has but one rational justification: capital, and by extension, self-interest.  However, it would not be inconceivable to assume that Russia’s benign stance towards Syria is due not only to its vested interests in a strong relationship with Bashar al-Assad, but also due to the Syrian dictator’s eagerness to exaggerate his significance to Russia. Perhaps Assad is attempting to weave his war against the uprising into the more ubiquitous issue of Russia’s current disputes with NATO, to Syria’s advantage.

Nevertheless, Russia’s merciful stance toward the stumbling Syrian regime, even when taking into consideration current financial arrangements, is inexplicable. Even if one assumes that current arms deals and historical ties explain the former superpower’s benevolence, surely it realises that support for the current Syrian regime cuts off possibilities for collaboration with the next. Given the increasing chances for regime change, a sagacious policy might be a degree of tempered support for a peaceful opposition in the hopes that any following government would, based on that support, be willing to maintain previously agreed upon deals that benefit both parties. In any case, Russia’s continued collaboration with the struggling Assad government bodes ill for the emancipative aspirations of the country’s population at large.

A frequent argument has been that sanctions not only hit the regime leaders, but that they hit hard on the working classes, “making people poor and hungry”[1]. Moreover, looking at the Iraqi example, it is argued that sanctions may even strengthen the leader’s grip on the country. Impoverishing the population, sanctions make people even more dependent on state supplies for their every-day survival and, as a consequence, make them less able to challenge state domination over society. These ethical questions are important and it is well-known that sanctions alone cannot bring a regime down. However, in the Syrian case, sanctions add to an internal grass-roots pressure, and more recently, an increasing military threat from the Free Syrian Army. The FSA is drawing more and more defectors to its side and has proved its capabilities, boasting increasingly significant attacks. As each country is specific, it is important to look at the effects of these sanctions on the internal structures of power of the regime and on its basis of support among the population. By weakening the internal structures and by loosening the ties with their support base, these sanctions are effectively tipping the balance in favor of the opposition.

The first reason why these sanctions are efficient pertains to what guarantees solidarity among people within the regime- the elite but also those in lower ranks. The elite consists of government and deputy ministers, top managers of the public sector, generals, members of the Baath party regional Command. During the past twenty years, the Baathist ideology has lost most of its influence[2]. The Baathist rhetoric does not a play a role of cement any more. The bonds that tie up people actively taking part in the incumbent regime are, to a large extent, patronage relationships.

Even though the formal institutions of the regime are the security apparatus (army and intelligence services), the party, and the bureaucracy, institutional relations are reinforced by informal personal links resting on patronage relationships.[3] Patronage, as a technique of power, is based on the exchange of resources, or access to them, in exchange for loyalty or obedience.[4]  This system constitutes a hierarchical, informal network of dependence between patrons and clients that operates behind the façades of public institutions. These networks can be visualised as a pyramid, with, at the summit, the president, his close family and the regime’s most influential barons. Each person in this pyramid has a patron, upon which he depends for obtaining privileges (money, business opportunities, a blind eye to corrupted practices etc.) in exchange for which he pledges allegiance to him. But every person also has a wide network of clients with whom he redistributes a part of the privileges obtained. These informal hierarchical top-down networks of patronage pervade all institutions and even all levels of society, securing allegiance from very different people, with different or even conflicting interests and who would have not necessarily supported the regime otherwise. This, moreover, fragments society[5], forcing people to search in personal relationships with regime officials for the solution to their problems.

Firstly, by targeting high rank individuals, sanctioning their businesses and freezing their assets abroad, international sanctions have disconnected the summit, from the rest of the pyramid. The ‘hubs’ through which money and privileges was channeled are now ‘dysfunctional’. As it becomes more and more difficult to pour resources into these networks, the whole coherence and solidarity of the regime is less stable. Secondly, in addition to targeting the mechanisms of these structures, sanctions are also targeting the source of the resources. Secondly, in addition to targeting the mechanisms of these structures, sanctions are also targeting the way in which privileges are granted to clients. As business opportunities have dried up with the end of foreign investments in the country, privileges only take the form of bribes and the appropriation of public money. On the other hand, before the crisis, the oil sector accounted for half of state revenues, and 90% was exported to the European Union. The EU ban on oil implemented on the 2^nd of September has drastically restricted the liquid assets available to be poured in these networks.[6] As Samir Seifan states, the depletion of state resources means that “the regime has ceased to be a source of benefits for the groups that are loyal to it.”[7] Solidarity within the regime is now only guaranteed by fear of popular vengeance in the case of regime change. This is certainly not enough to provide the regime with a long-term future.

The second reason for economic sanctions’ efficiency is their role in alienating the regime’s support base. By dramatically reducing Syria’s exports, they endanger the stability of the Syrian pound. And as Bashar al-Assad recognized in June[8], the issue of the Syrian pound is of fundamental importance to the ongoing crisis. The regime did not only ensure its power by relying on individual loyalty (network of patronage), it supported this policy with the broad co-optation of socio-economic classes to give the regime some legitimacy. No matter what the anti-regime Syrian activists say, the regime has been relying on more than merely the military and Intelligence apparatus. Every regime needs a support base among the population to consolidate its legitimacy so as to avoid appearing as a military dictatorship. Without a socio-economic basis of support, the regime has no legitimacy whatsoever, and consequently no long-term future. Indeed, the history of Baathist Syria shows that co-opting large parts of society has always been a priority.

Since the Baathist revolution in 1963 and then Hafez al-Assad’s coup in 1970, urban and agricultural workers have been the traditional support for the regime. However, since the economic crisis of the mid-1980s, the rapid depletion of oil reserves and, as a consequence, the decrease in state revenues, it has been impossible to preserve the welfare state on a level on which the allegiance of the working classes was dependent. The regime subsequently entered a financial stranglehold. Hafez al-Assad decided to implement economic liberalisation. Even though this change in policy was likely to accelerate the alienation of working classes, it was aimed at co-opting large parts of the business community. This policy has been continued by Bashar al-Assad since his assumption of power in 2000. Since the alienation of urban and agricultural workers reached a level which was unthinkable before March, the business community is the only socio-economic classes on which the regime can rely.

As the majority of the Syrian business community is a commercial bourgeoisie, whose wealth has been built through import-export trade, the exchange rate is a key issue for Syrian entrepreneurs. The EU ban on oil imports, decided on the 2^nd of September, has made an imminent collapse of the Syrian pound a distinct possibility. Before the unrest, oil accounted for two thirds of Syrian exports[9], and the EU was the destination for more than 90% of it. The regime is now unable to find buyers for around 140,000 barrels of crude oil per day[10] while the daily production is 240,000 barrels. The negative balance of payments reduces the Central Bank’s currency reserves and a depletion of these reserves would lead to the collapse of the national currency. Even though state officials affirmed that the Central Bank had enough foreign currency reserves to secure imports for two years[11], numerous recent state decisions suggest that pressure on the national currency is extreme.[12]

A common argument is that the business community will never turn against the regime. I think this depends on what we mean by “turning against the regime”. Indeed, it seems unlikely that famous businessmen will either take an official stance in support of regime change, or financially support opposition groups. But in fear of a possible collapse of the pound they might be tempted to transfer their assets abroad. During the third quarter of the year, deposits in Syrian private banks decreased by 18%, while, according to the Byblos Bank, deposits in Syrian accounts held by Lebanese banks dropped by 24% by the end of April.[13] This increases the pressure on the currency and its collapse is even more likely.

The sanctions are undermining the structures on which the regime relies. They weaken the coherence of the regime and alienate its support base. In addition to the pressure from the Free Syrian Army and an increasing diplomatic isolation, it seems clear that there is no way back to stability for Bashar al-Assad. In these conditions, will the soldiers continue to obey orders to kill protesters while it becomes obvious that retaliation will not bring stability back? The fact that they are now risking their lives and that the payment of salaries is becoming uncertain[14] may help them answer this question. So yes, sanctions are efficient. They are tipping the balance.

Mass protest in Hama

Crisis Project is hearing an increasing number of reports that children and schools are being targeted by the Syrian army and security forces. Our contacts on the ground in Syria report numerous child fatalities in and around local schools. There appears to be no substantial explanation for these attacks, so our assumption must remain that these are children that have refused to participate in pro-Assad rallies, or engaged in opposition demonstrations.

Here are a few examples:

In al-Holeh, five children were reported to have been targeted with gunfire outside their school on November 22nd- four of them were killed as a result. Furthermore, the school itself has seen a substantial decline in attendance due to government occupation.

In the city of Hama, Ibn Reshd school has also been beset by security forces in recent days. Crisis Project has been informed that regime-loyal forces entered the school in order to arrest students after a local protest. This school is now occupied by security forces.

In Homs, the Shabiha and regime forces are said to have stormed the school of Al-Bayad neighborhood, where they raised their weapons and terrorized students who are all 15 years or younger.

In the city of Deir al-Zour, 15 year old Mohammed Mulla Eissa, was reportedly shot in front of classmates by security forces upon refusing to join a pro-Assad rally. It is also reported that when security forces realised the first bullet did not instantly kill, the commander issued a direct command: “Shoot him again to make sure he dies.”

Resolute across Syria

Despite increasing intimidation and violence administered by security forces upon the younger generation, tenacious students and children seem determined in their efforts to involve themselves in the country’s popular uprising. Excitement and optimism continue to pervade a community wracked by daily threats to their lives. This persistence was illustrated by a demonstration held on the 24th November in Al-Sabouniya neighbourhood in Hama by the students of the girls’ school of Um Al-Shahid. Female empowerment appears to be a recurring theme in the nationwide protests.

The repression of the Syrian opposition has now reached a point of unprecedented brutality on the part of the security forces, and the international media needs to recognise this. It is unclear how much control President Bashar al-Assad has over the army and Shabiha, but it is clear that everyone is being targeted in their efforts to regain stability through fear mongering.

The Free Syrian Army has stated that their primary objective is to protect the protesters from its governmental counterpart, but the increasing numbers in the former, and the apparent reluctance of the latter to stand down, may well lead to civil war.

Two examples of children’s presence in the uprising, in Homs on November 23rd:
- http://bit.ly/rYARt1
- http://bit.ly/rNQt04

By Luke Errington-Barnes and Michael Everard, 25.11.11. ]]> http://crisisproject.org/schools-under-siege-in-syria/feed/ 0