Similarly, Turkish democracy has effectively come to represent the will of the people. Its multi-party system allows political pluralism. With over 50+ parties (2002), the parliament acts as a forum for the deliberation of the many ideological standpoints held by the different segments of the population (Alevi, Naksibendi etc).  The composition ranges from the Islamist (Ser’i) Justice and Development Party (AKP) to the secular-Cemalist Republican People’s Party (CHP). This provides sufficient choice for the ‘people’ to decide which suits them (and not be restricted to a single part group, as was the case before 1946). Similarly, universal suffrage, extended over females and males equally, has typified further a healthy democratic governance within its borders.  This extended franchise naturally allows greater political participation and an expanded electorate, ensuring that the government accurately represents the views of the populace. In addition, Turkey has a separation of powers, where its legislative, executive, and judicial elements are divided, ensuring that there is internal balance and political equality.  In this respect it has come to parallel Western liberal democracies also in the structure of its system. 

A further hallmark of democracy is popular sovereignty and autonomy.  As democracy is a rule ‘by the people’ the sovereignty and autonomy of the state is essential in ensuring that the country is governed according to the wishes of its inhabitants, and not that of external actors. Lebanese democracy however depends ‘on the continued good will and stability of the external environment that helped nurture it’ (5). This undermines its prospect as a democratic state as it lies in a heavily contested region- the Levant. Many of its political parties are an extension of foreign interests (e.g. Hezbollah is a Iranian proxy and the Phalange an Israeli proxy) and thereby do not reflect autonomy. However, though they are influenced by foreign interests they are still popularly elected, assuring at least some degree of popular sovereignty.

Similarly, a significant impediment to a democratic Turkey is the intercession of the military in its political affairs. Its influence was what overthrew the Refah Party (the legitimate government) in 1997, effectively undermining Turkish democracy and circumventing popular mandate. More importantly however is its corollary. Since the ‘February 28 decisions’ that removed the Refah, the ‘role of the military in political life was both legalised and institutionalised’ (6). This as a consequence has given it a ‘free hand for formulating policies in respect to internal as well as the external security of the country’ (7). This makes the voting process and democracy at large, redundant, as the military may (now and in future) violate electoral outcome.  However, the right of intervention by the military in state affair is sanctioned by the constitution. As a constitution is a staple of democratic states (for it provides the rule of law by which democracy is founded), this right exercised by the military is not necessarily undemocratic. It is undemocratic in so far as it disregards popular sentiment but it is ‘democratic’ in that it is complies  with the Republic’s  laws and constitution. However for genuine democratic, the people’s will must be prioritised over that of the military.

A further hallmark of democracy is freedom of media and expression. Freedom of expression is crucial to ‘personal democracy’, the freedom to choose one’s rulers but also one’s lifestyle.  In Lebanon, the Al-Manar broadcast – Hezbollah’s propaganda channel-is shown freely and without censorship. Such a thing would not be permitted even in conventional western democracies (like US)   In fact, the very existence of Hezbollah (and state toleration of its fundamentalist agenda) in politics and social life is an indication of Lebanese democratic freedom. Further, unlike other Muslim -majority countries, the question of women’s public appearance and wear is open to personal preference. There is no state enforcement on matters concerning personal lifestyle (like the burka).  In fact, it is precisely this freedom that makes it, in social terms, a liberal democratic state. Contrastingly, Turkey lacks this same ‘freedom’. ‘YouTube’s’ censorship (2007-current) has undermined the nation’s E-democracy. As ‘YouTube’ is an international symbol of free media, its suppression raises doubts over the accessibility of information and media in  Turkey. A further current controversy is the headscarf issue. By law, the religious headscarf is banned from being worn by females in Universities. This severely restricts their right of worship -a right that that is common in most democracies. Though ‘laicite’, the separation of church from state, is a common democratic theme, it appears that in the case of Turkey, secularity is sustained at the expense of individual freedom. As Kalaycioglu states Turkey’s ‘major democratic ‘fault line’, is its inability to accommodate personal religious choice within a rigidly secular state’ (8). Yet, social freedom has improved significantly as the wearing of the headscarf in public has become more tolerated (as seen in the prime-minister’s wife), and media has become privatized, thereby ensuring less state bias.

A further characteristic is the common good /welfare of the individual and community at  large  (the rule ‘for the people’).  In Turkey, Kurdish minority rights have been largely  neglected  and violated. The recent ban (by the Constitutional Court,  Friday December 11, 2009) of the  only pro-Kurdish party – the Democratic Society Party (DTP) –effectively  removed the minority’s political representation. As such the ‘common good’ (which  depended on representation) has been deprived to 10-13 million Kurds that live in that  country. In addition, the ‘inefficiency of governmental budgets to provide social welfare and services’ (9) to  society at large has restricted its ability to serve even its native population. Despite this,  certain cultural right have been recognized for the Kurds, ensuring state  acknowledgement of their basic human rights. In Lebanon, favoritism has restricted the ‘common good’ to elites, at the expense of the other minorities.  The dominance of the Sunni Hariri family (currently in power) and its favoritism   towards the Sunni minority, fails to ensure a democracy that is ecumenically ‘for the people’.  However, this favoritism is only temporary. As it is an electoral democracy, leadership is renewed and thus this impediment does not hinder the ‘common good’ permanently (though  it does chronically). A further characteristic of a democratic state is a free-market economy. The reason for this  being associated with democracy is that it ensures equal opportunity for social and financial  advancement. Lebanon however is dirigisme. Much of the ‘economic policy is statist’ (10)  something which has increased interference with enterprise. Yet, there is no official obstacle  to private trade. Its favourable economic climate, ensures greater opportunity for the masses.   The Turkish liberal economics also ensure equal social advancements, with  relaxed tariffs that has made it a candidate to join the European Union (which is a  free-market union and effetcively  a ‘democratic’ bloc).

In conclusion, both nations are indeed democratic but are restricted by certain flaws.   Turkey is an example of a political democracy i.e. a state that is built by the vote and thus, the  will of the people. Lebanon best embodies democracy in the alternate meaning of the label-  freedom of personal lifestyle and right. The major obstacle to a democratic Turkey is military  interference in its politics.  Closer cooperation and dialogue between the state and the  military can remedy this. Lebanon needs only a government that represents the people as a  whole and not that of its elites  (breaking from its consociational roots) to ensure a genuine  democracy. Ironically, it is their past which founded their democracy, that presents the  greatest challenge to their democracy today.  

BY RAYMOND ABOU-MANSOUR [PELECANOS] FOR TRANSNATIONAL CRISIS PROJECT

Bibliography-

(1) http://moodle.ucl.ac.uk/file.php/602/odonnell-what.democracy.is.pdf Academic Journal O’ Donnel, ‘The perpetual crisis of democracy’ 

(2) Politics Andrew Heywood (third edition) Palgrave foundations 2007 Chapter ‘Defining Democracy’ (pg 72)  

(3) Penguin books 2003: Democracy in America: and Two essays on America‎ – Page xxviii-Alexis de Tocqueville, Gerald E. Bevan, Isaac Kramnick

(4) http://www.lcps-lebanon.org/pub/breview/br6/tuenibr6.html Academic Journal- The Beirut Review No. 6 Fall 1993 The ‘Democracy in Lebanon: Anatomy of a Crisis’ Ghassan Tueni

(5) http://www.lcps-lebanon.org/pub/breview/br6/tuenibr6.html Academic Journal- The Beirut Review No. 6 Fall 1993 The ‘Democracy in Lebanon: Anatomy of a Crisis’ Ghassan Tueni

(6) Ali Carkoglu and Barry Rubin ‘Religion and Politics in Turkey’ Routledge 2006 (ISBN 0-415-34831-5) Chapter: ‘Islam and Democracy in Turkey’ Binazz Toprak  pg. (74)

(7) Ali Carkoglu and Barry Rubin ‘Religion and Politics in Turkey’ Routledge 2006 (ISBN 0-415-34831-5) Chapter:  ‘Islam and Democracy in Turkey’ Binazz Toprak  pg. (73)

(8) Ali Carkoglu and Ersin Kalaycioglu- ‘Turkish Democracy Today- Elections Protest and Stability in an Islamic Society’ IB Tauris (ISBN 978 1 845111 185 4) 2007, Chapter:  ‘Analysing Political Participation at Macro-Level of Analysis’ pg 23

(9) Ali Carkoglu and Barry Rubin ‘Religion and Politics in Turkey’ Routledge 2006 (ISBN 0-415-34831-5)  Chapter:  ‘Islam and Democracy in Turkey’ Binazz Toprak  (pg.  38)

(10)  http://www.democracyinlebanon.org/Documents/CDL-InternationalReports/UNISCIKhouriDiL.pdf Academic Journal ‘The Future of Democracy in Lebanon Riad al-khouri) UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 12(October 2006) ISSN 1696-2206

BLACKWATER MERCENARY

The privatisation of security generates significant political and conceptual implications. Security is commoditised and contracted within the open market, undermining the state monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force. This in turn entails a normative shift away from the traditional conception of the state as the sole internal and external security actor, and concurrently creates a private security industry that empowers non-state actors with same capabilities formally held exclusively by the state. This both erodes core state functions but also simultaneously strengthens state capabilities by encouraging the creation of new forms of security governance and increasing the pool of resources available for states to drawn on to augment their coercive power. Outsourcing security services from the private sector and reliance on it for the provision of an array of offensive, logistical and consultative services is also evidence of a neo-liberal and free market ideology originating from the Anglo-American world (which 70% of the market for force is also currently concentrated in). As a consequence, security acquires a commercial character and a cooperate structure in the form of Private Security Companies (PSCs) and Private Military Companies (PMCs) that are motivated by profit rather than national interest. This has both international and domestic political corollaries and conceptual implications for what security is and how it is provisioned.

The main implication for the state is the fragmentation of the control and partial loss of the use of force. The privatisation of security spreads military and coercive capabilities over different security actors, altering the means with which the state manages and uses violence for the execution of its security objectives. This not only necessitates the creation of new institutional mechanisms in order to regulate new security actors but also makes power more fungible between them, making the use of force more accessible and unpredictable. This problem is accentuated by the commercial and transnational nature of PSC operations that transfers core state capabilities into cooperate entities that are too manoeuvrable and too fluid to control. This coupled with the limited capacity on the part of states to both effectively constrain the actions and monitor the activities of these new security actors undermines the state in itself. As Small confirms, ‘Private security is the antithesis to the founding principles of the modern nation state’ (Small 2006: 14). Conceptually, this not only signals an ontological shift away from state-centric approaches to security but also means that the state is no longer the sole unit of security analysis (thereby deviating substantial from traditional IR scholarship). Similarly, the privatisation of security enhances the capabilities of non-state actors that can alter the distribution of power and the political configuration of the international system. The international system has traditional been defined in terms of the state and interstate dynamics, marginalising the role and influence of non-state actors. However, as a consequence of the privatisation of security, strong non-state actors can acquire coercive capabilities that are linked to the pursuit of security. This not only complicates traditional security analysis by undermining its underlying assumptions, but also means that new private actors can effect both international and domestic politics. As Avant supports, privatisation ‘will advantage different actors and strategies’ (Avant 2004: 511). This is especially the case with the rise of private military companies. Many PMCs are connected as subsidiaries to larger multinational cooperations and conglomerates (an example beig the now defunct Executive Outcomes that was part of the mining and extracting firm, Branch-Heritage Group) that come to possess resources and assets that can not only surpass smaller states but also overpower weaker and fragile governments. This not only gives non-state actors the the ability to exert significant influence over them (and even further the commercial interests of their parent company) but also the ability to pursue their own independent agendas in international relations. This latter point was evident with the role of Executive Outcomes in cooperating and mobilising the Nigerian –headed ECOMOG operation to pacify the civil war in Sierra Leone, not only in order to fulfil its contract but primarily in order to secure its commercial interests and mineral concessions. This combination of both hard and soft power gives private security actors capabilities comparable to that of the state itself. As supports Walker supports, ‘structurally, private enterprise is feared to surpass the state’ (Walker 2005: 618). Though the state remains the main security actor (in part because private security actors remain depended on the state for their legal and empirical existence), the privatisation of security nevertheless transfers power to non-state actors that become an integral part of the security landscape. 

A further implication of the privatisation of security is the reconfiguration of domestic political power. The use of PMCs enhances the power of executive over the legislature and provides opportunities for political elites to bypass established political process in the formulation and implementation of security policy. Both the separation of powers is subverted (as the executive circumvents legislative checks and balances) and the legitimacy and legality of the foreign policy is undermined, as policy-makers are able to conduct foreign policy by proxy rather than in public purview. As confirmed by Leander, ‘it de-politicises security moving it out of the public realm’ (Leander 2005: 819). The formulation of security policy is also moved out of public debate depriving the public sector of the opportunity to scrutinise and to refine it and to customise it to the needs of the population rather than to a select clientele. In effect, due to its contractual nature, privatised security effectively caters more for sectional interests rather than for collective interests, consequently narrowing its scope. Further, the limited transparency and accountability associated with the privatisation of security can have a significant negative political impact both domestically and internationally. Not only does it undermine a fundamental characteristic of democratic and liberal political systems (making this particularly important for European security regimes), but also increases the chance for misperception and misinterpretation in the international sphere. This can lead to a deterioration of interstate relations as it erodes ‘trust and increases tensions with other democracies’ (Avant 2006: 515), especially as new private actors operate in international legal grey zones that make them unaccountable for violations and transgressions. This also has implication for alliance structures as these are also based on effective communication and trust. Another implication of the privatisation of security is the structural and institutional imbalance that it can cause between the public and private sector. The emergence of new private security actors can clash and overlap with the existing security functions and actors of the public sector, undermining ‘the consolidation of public security structures’ (Leander 2005: 606). The division of responsibilities and chain of command are similarly blurred that can lead to the inefficient allocation of security resources. This has significant ramifications for the military-industrial complex as it both undermines its fundamental purpose and conflicts with its activities. The provision of external and internal security (conventionally conducted via the military and the police respectively) is transferred to private actors destabilising the equilibrium between the two that can cause dissension between the civil sector and the military and government at large (especially as the privatisation of security limits civilian control over the armed forces). This can have destabilising effect on the state and on the long-0term provision of security services. 

There are also important conceptual corollaries to the privatisation of security. Privatised security accentuates the orientation towards a neo-liberal understanding of security based on cooperation and interdependence. This is both because the diffusion of capabilities to private actors necessitates closer collaboration between the public and the private sector and because the outsourcing of resources used to resolve common security problems needs to be coordinated effectively to have a permanent and satisfactory result. This in turn changes the means in which security is pursued, by basing it on multilateral rather than unilateral action. This undermines the neo-realist assumption that states always strive towards self-sufficiency and accelerates the tendency towards greater reliance and interaction with the global market place. This not only intensifies international interaction between different actors and thus further propelling globalisation, but also gives the pursuit of security a global outlook (that subsequently shifts the nature of security management from security government to security governance). As Khrahmann supports, ‘the increasing level of international interaction/has been one of the defining characteristics of globalisation’ (Khrahmann 2003: 17). There is also another important corollary to the privatisation of security that is linked to this process. Security becomes a ‘private commodity rather than a public good’ (Avant 2004: 154) not only narrowing the availability of security services to those that can afford it, but also signalling the abandonment of its ideological nature. Security, especially if conceived as the alleviation of threats to acquired values, is connected to an ideational and value-based framework. The privatisation of security changes this as private security actors are not tied to any particular normative reference but rather operate under a market logic. As security becomes commoditized, it also gets de-ideologised. As Singer confirms, the privatisation of security has contributed to a ‘normative shift towards the marketization of the public sphere’ (Singer 2002: 197). 

The privatisation of security also expands the themes and issues-areas considered part of security. By operating in multiple markets and for multiple stakeholders, private actors can specialise in the provision of security in select sectors that would have otherwise been overlooked or marginalised by conventional security actors like the state (in effect specialising in a ‘niche’ in the same way as companies do in order to establish a unique selling point in a competitive market). This helps expand the security agenda, as new themes are considered alongside traditional security issues. For example, both economic security and individual human security have traditionally been superseded by more abstract and overreaching security concerns like national security. The privatisation of security enables a greater number of actors to independently confront these novel security challenges and concepts, consequently expanding the definition of what security is and what it should encompass. This notion is even more salient considering that the majority of these new security threats (such as failed states, international crime and narcotics trade) are transnational in scope, just as the activities of private security actors are themselves transnational in nature. Similarly, another critical implication of the privatisation of security is the capacity for private actors to shape the conceptualisation and understanding of security itself. In addition to granting political elites greater leverage over the formulation of security policy, privatisation also gives the opportunity for private actors to construct and frame security discourses. As Leander supports, PSCs ‘increasingly shape which issues and problems are securitised-turned into existential threats –and which kind of (re-)action is to be considered most appropriate’ (Leander 2005: 804). This is not only because private security actors retain strong links with governments and can therefore lobby their views to policy-makers, but also because they select and structure the information that constitute the security agenda particular to each client. This not only effects their knowledge about a particular security issue (giving private actors the ability to persuade them into courses of action they may not have otherwise engaged in) but also shapes the ‘self-understanding and interests of security actors’ themselves (Leander 2005: 813). As the mission statement of MPRI (Military Professional Resources Incorporated) supports, ‘Our work ranges from assisting Ministries of Defence establish policies, procedures, and strategic plans’ (Leander 2005: 535) that effectively come to defining the security doctrine of the clients themselves. This is further accentuated by the market logic that private security actors operate in. As a result of the desire to sell their services, private security actors deliberately heighten a sense of risk and threat in order to secure contracts and gain a competitive advantage over rival firms. This not only stimulates even greater demand for their services but also contributes to the subjective creation of new security threats (whether imagined or genuine) that can revamp existing security priorities and redefine what needs to be secured (the referent object). This can have significant political ramifications as the private sector acquires the capacity to formulate security policies that that may not necessarily corroborate to reality or to the interests of the client itself. Thus the privatisation of security also enhances the capacity for private actors to define security threats and their solutions in ways that can favour their own commercial interests rather than that of their clients. 

In conclusion, the privatisation of security has many conceptual and political implications. In the context of European security, the privatisation of security not only runs in tandem to the general free-market trends consistent with the ideological framework of Europe’s two main security regimes (both the Europe Union and NATO) but also reflects the larger process of marketization linked to globalisation. The provision of security and capabilities associated with it are diffused over a number of actors that consequently empowers new actors at the expense of old ones. The ultimate implication of the privatisation however is a shift towards a market based understanding of security that deviates significantly from traditional models and carries significant political ramification both for the legitimacy and effectiveness of its provision.

 BY RAYMOND ABOU-MANSOUR [PELECANOS] FOR TRANSNATIONAL CRISIS PROJECT 

BIBLIOGRAPHY-

Andreas, P. and Price, R. (2001) “From War-fighting to Crime-fighting: Transforming the American National Security State”, International Studies Review 3(3): 31-52

Avant, D. (2006) ‘The Implications of Marketized Security for IR Theory: The Democratic Peace, Late State Building, and the Nature and Frequency of Conflict’, Perspectives on Politics, 4(3): 507-528

Avant, D. (2004) ‘The Privatization of Security and Change in the Control of Force’ International Studies Perspectives, 5(2): 153–157.

Baldwin, D.A. (1997), ‘The concept of security’ Review of International Studies, 23(1): 5-26

Bures, O. (2005): ‘Private military companies: A second best peacekeeping option?’, International Peacekeeping, 12(4): 533-546

Dorn N. and Levi, M. (2007), ‘European Private Security, Corporate Investigation and Military Services: Collective Security, Market Regulation and Structuring the Public Sphere’, Policing & Society, 17(3): 213-238

Francis, D. J. (1999), ‘Mercenary Intervention in Sierra Leone: Providing National Security or International Exploitation?’, Third World Quarterly, 20(2): 319-338

Krahmann, E. (2003), ‘Conceptualizing Security Governance’, Cooperation and Conflict, 38(1): 5-26.

Krahmann, E (2005), Security Governance and Networks: New Theoretical Perspectives in Transatlantic Security’, Review of International Affairs, 18(1): 15-30

Krahmann, E, (2011), ‘Beck and Beyond: selling security in the world risk society’, Review of International Studies, 36 (3): 349–372

Leander, A. (2005), ‘The Market for Force and Public Security: The Destabilizing Consequences of Private Military Companies’, Journal of Peace Research, 42 (5): 605–622

Leander, A. (2005) ‘The Power to Construct International Security: On the Significance of Private Military Companies’ Millennium Journal of International Studies, 33 (3): 803-825

O’Brien, K. ‘Military Advisory Groups and African Security: Privatising Peacekeeping’, International Peacekeeping, 5(3): 89-99

Singer, P.W. (2002) ‘Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for International Security’, International Security, 26 (3): 186-220

Small, M. (2006), ‘Privatisation of Security and Military Functions and the Demise of the Modern Nation-State in Africa’, Occasional Paper Series: 1(2): 3-29

Walker, C. and Whyte, D. (2005), ‘Contracting out War? : Private Military Companies, Law and Regulation in the United Kingdom’, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 54(3): 651-689.

The newly elected Egyptian Parliament

As part of what appears to be something of international PR tour, delegates from the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) – the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood – spoke at Chatham House on Wednesday 28^th last week in their first official visit to the UK, discussing the challenges faced by Egypt’s burgeoning democracy, and laying out their vision for the country’s future.

The FJP emphasised that that their vision of a future Egyptian state is founded upon the principle of Democracy, and is civilian-led, i.e. freed from the current suffocating grip of the military. The FJP were keen to state their opposition to the current junta, and strongly criticised the continuing domination of generals and ex-generals over the economy, at least 30% of which they claim is army-controlled. The speakers stated that this military control over the Egyptian economy is one of the first problems that must be addressed in order to facilitate the development of a free market economy. 

Economic policy was identified as the most important and pressing issue facing post-revolutionary Egypt,  FJP delegates discussing their ‘Renaissance Project’ which has the lofty aim of simplifying the bureaucratic problems and corruption that plague business developments across the country. The FJP laid out a strongly capitalist vision of economic reforms, stating that they intended to rely on the private sector to be the driving force in revitalising the economy. To facilitate economic development, the FJP intend to assist the legalisation of much of the street-level  ‘black-market’ sector, and used some (uncorroborated) statistics to suggest that by bringing these external economies into the legal system, GNP will increase by 2-3%. Dr Claire Spencer, Head of Chatham House’s MENA program, questioned the reliability of these statistics, a point which was accepted by FJP delegates, acknowledging the problems inherent in attempting to measure economic processes which are, by their very nature, concealed and clandestine. This dependence on flawed statistics for their economic policy lent a rather doubtful air to discussions, drawing into question the FJP’s ability to enact real, positive reform.

In terms of foreign policy, FJP delegates emphasised their intention to continue to acknowledge the existing treaties with Israel, something which they claimed no other party has committed officially to do. However, in an attempt to appease supporters of both sides of the conflict, they simultaneously denounced Israel’s ongoing blockage of Gaza as ‘illegal and bordering on genocide’ and stated they would continue to support Hamas as the legitimate representatives of the people of Gaza.

When confronted with some probing questions about the FJP going beyond their mandate in choosing candidates for the committee to write the constitution, delegates emphasised the need for Egyptians to learn to accept the ballot box as the legitimate form of sanction for political power. Rather ironically, in a marked-deviation from their pre-election promises, the FJP  on Saturday 31^st announced that they would be fielding one of their own candidates, Khairat al-Shater, for the Egyptian Presidency.  This move has been fiercely controversial, and has received strong criticism from secular and liberal critics both in Egypt and internationally.

Whilst the delegates from the FJP were certainly keen to present themselves in a moderate, enlightened vein to the London audience, their true intentions over the future of Egypt and the place of Islam within this remain ambiguous. Their decision to reverse earlier promises about running for the Presidency, and their rather contradictory stances on issues such as Palestine make it hard to take their words at face value. Although we should not discount the FJP’s efforts to build relationships abroad, it is worth keeping a cautious eye on gaps between diplomatic rhetoric and their actions on the ground in building a new ‘democratic’ Egyptian state.

The real impact of the shooting has yet to unfold. It may have little effect as the date of the American withdrawal draws nearer. However, it could have a lasting political effect in the United States, particularly with the imminent presidential elections.

In Afghanistan, the shooting has driven already-elevated anti-American sentiments skyward. With the impending star of summer, typically the most heated fighting season, America’s last few months in Central Asia could be difficult.

President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, condemned the attack. ‘This is an assassination,’ he said. ‘An intentional killing of innocent civilians and cannot be forgiven’.

On 13 March, as a government delegation was sent to the Panjwai area of Kandahar to treat with villagers and local elders, a 20-minute gun battle between Taliban forces and Afghan Security Forces ensued. One soldier and three militiamen were killed and an intelligence officer was wounded. In Jalalabad, 600 students participated in an anti-American rally in protest against the ongoing Western presence in Afghanistan. The Taliban released a statement condemning American attacks on civilians.

The U.S. effort in Afghanistan may also be affected. The staff sergeant implicated in the attacks was serving alongside Special Forces teams engaging in Village Stability Operations (VSOs). VSOs are one of the chief methods that the United States has developed to help spur the growth of local government and civil society in rural regions of Afghanistan. The incident may be detrimental programme’s future credibility and effectiveness.

In the American political arena, continued anti-American sentiment in Afghanistan is turning Republicans and the public against U.S. strategy in Central Asia. Republicans have expressed dissatisfaction with maintaining the same end-date in light of what may be an unachievable goal.

President Barack Obama’s objective remains to ensure that Afghanistan can secure its own borders and prevent the reemergence of al Qaeda. The President did, however make clear that this goal should be achieved before the withdrawal of forces in 2014.

He said, ‘It’s important for us to make sure that we get out in a responsible way, so that we don’t end up having to go back in.’

Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta said that events such as these, and by extension the sentiments in Afghanistan, will not alter U.S. strategy. An Afghan official told the Washington Post that the strain in relations between the countries could delay or challenge the signing of a strategic partnership agreement. An agreement is as yet undecided because Afghanistan will not grant the United States Military legal immunity.

In addition to the strategic and political implications of the killings, another issue is brought to the forefront — the mental health of America’s armed forces, particularly those serving multiple tours.

In 2009, the Army found that troops serving multiple tours in Afghanistan developed post-traumatic stress disorder of other psychological problems at a rate of 31% while those serving only one tour were less than half as likely to do so. An Iraq-based study found that about 15% of troops serving two tours were 2.5 times as likely to develop PTSD as those serving one tour.

The staff sergeant was serving his first tour in Afghanistan but his fourth overall, after having spent three tours in Iraq. He has a history of mental health problems since 2010 when his vehicle overturned in Iraq leaving him with a traumatic brain injury and had marital problems between tours.

While mental health care has vastly improved for returning forces, it remains a major issue to be addressed by the U.S. military.

Obama supported the need to promote mental health programmes for returning soldiers. He said, ‘We’ve got to make sure that we’re caring for our soldiers…And that’s why we’ve actually put more resources into dealing with post-traumatic stress disorder, traumatic brain injuries’.

The Pentagon and the Joint IED Defeat Organization commissioned ReconRobotics to design a system to counter attacks on ground troops. The programme cost the Pentagon $13.4 million.

Foot patrols are becoming more dangerous. Since last year, roadside bombs are up 20 percent and IED and mine explosions are among the highest levels of the war. Pressure plate and remote detonated IEDs and land mines have a kill rate of 40 percent. Through July of this year, there have been 79 multiple amputations in the U.S. military alone, the highest since 9/11. There have been 1,924 attacks on troops on foot this year, marking a 92 percent increase from June to August as compared to summer 2010.

Attacks on Coalition forces, 2008-2011

This figure outlines the number of attacks by insurgents in Afghanistan from 2008 to the present. The 2011 figures are on the far right.

One of the biggest problems these patrols face is the difficulty of reconnaissance due to the Afghan building style that features high, impenetrable mud and brick walls surrounding labyrinthine compounds. The Recon Scout robots are designed to illuminate the layout of enclosed spaces, detect IEDs and determine if a person is a friendly soldier, a civilian or an enemy. SearchSticks become pole cameras that will be used to see over compound walls, onto rooftops and into culverts.

The ‘throwbots’ weigh 1.2 pounds and can be deployed in five seconds and reach a height of 120 feet.

But technological solutions have a history of failure or irrelevance in the Afghan and Iraq wars. Technical adaptation is typically swiftly overcome by a matching adaptation in the insurgent’s own tactics. This was the trend that brought about pressure-plate IEDs and Explosively Formed Projectiles (EFPs). The 2007 push by the U.S. military to deploy more MRAP vehicles in order to combat roadside IEDs was swiftly countered by the insurgents in Afghanistan. EFPs were developed to launch deadly molten metal into the vehicles’ vulnerable underbelly.

Literally throwing a new technological solution at an ongoing problem in Afghanistan may be yet another failed initiative by the U.S. Military. The Afghan war has proven it will not be shaped by technology and the military has gained only few advantages from the new technologies it has implemented over the course of the war.

The Throwbot solution runs the risk of continuing the pattern. What is somewhat promising about it is that it is a low-level answer to a high-level question. The problem of intelligence and reconnaissance in Afghan villages has plagued the U.S. and UK for years. This may, for a while, at least, give Americans a figurative leg up over the insurgents.

Colonel Peter Newell, director of the Army’s Rapid Equipping Force, said in USA Today, however

‘Every solution has a half-life. If you’re lucky, the insurgent will wait until you get it out there before he figures out a way to defeat it,’ he said.

For videos of the Recon Scout systems in action please see:

http://www.azorobotics.com/news.aspx?newsID=2131

In retaliation, Pakistan has closed the trans-border routes to NATO supply convoys, leaving hundreds of truckers stranded on the dangerous mountain roads.

This is not the first time the vital route has been affected by the war. Pakistan closed the supply line in 2010 after NATO accidentally killed three Pakistani soldiers.

Yet, only 30 percent of American supplies and less than half of NATO’s supplies are procured across the mountain highways. Most are shipped across Europe and Central Asia through Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, a far safer route for supply-truck convoys.

Inhibiting NATO suppliers from reaching Afghanistan, relations between the United States and Pakistan may devolve even further. They have been rocky since CIA contractor Raymond Davis was accused and then acquitted of the murders of two Lahore men in an armed robbery followed by the capture of Osama bin Laden from a Pakistani address just months later.


The limitations on NATO convoys does not only impact the day-to-day provisions of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, however. It could lead to increased violence along an already volatile border. In response to this, Pakistan provided paramilitary protection to its convoys affected by the closures.

The situation may exacerbate the instability in Afghanistan’s southern provinces. The Taliban has easy access to Afghanistan through the relative safe-haven of Pakistan across border routes. Closing these to NATO affiliates may boost insurgent traffic to other provinces south of Kunar, exacerbating an already difficult situation in southern Afghanistan.

However, because the bulk of NATO shipping does come through Central Asia, it will not suffer greatly from Pakistan’s actions but the incident will have a wider impact on relations between the U.S. and Pakistan and on southern Afghanistan’s security.

Both the United States and United Kingdom have set withdrawal dates for their troops in Afghanistan, though both intend to engage in foreign aid for some years to come.

While progress has been made on the military front, it is impossible to achieve security in a counterinsurgency war without political and civil stability. Thus, Western forces are seeking assurances that al-Qaida and the Taliban will be removed of their influence within Afghanistan.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who officially chaired the conference, said that at least a decade of international economic and political aid would be necessary to improve the situation in Afghanistan.

German foreign minister Guido Westerwelle, the conference’s host said the goal of Bonn II is to ensure that the people of Afghanistan will not be abandoned by the international community post-2014.

The World Bank has estimated that Afghanistan’s economic growth rate will be reduced by at least 50 percent after the withdrawal of troops, causing a potential economic collapse.

But TIME magazine claims that an aura of gloom and cynicism lingers over the proceedings in Germany, particularly because of the notable absence of Pakistan at the conference table. Pakistan is perceived as a key player in the potential talks between insurgent leaders and NATO and ISAF forces in Afghanistan.

Pakistan withdrew from attending the conference after NATO aircraft unintentionally fired on Pakistani border posts in late November, killing 24 Pakistani soldiers. Islamabad has also extended its military’s rules of engagement to allow soldiers to return fire if challenged by NATO forces.

Because Pakistan provides an invaluable safe haven for insurgents, it is crucial to peace negotiations in Afghanistan. Former Pakistani president, Pervez Musharraf told the Pakistan Observer that Bonn will not achieve any relevant results in Afghanistan because of the indeterminate nature of Taliban leadership.

In order for Afghanistan to achieve stability after the troop withdrawals scheduled for 2014 and 2015, it requires foreign economic and political aid. This remains a simple promise from the United States, which has few concrete plans for a continued presence in Afghanistan. However, the U.S. State Department plans to remain in Iraq for years with a bloated staff and huge $6 billion a year budget.

Afghanistan will require at least a similar commitment as its security situation is by no means to the same level as Iraq’s due to the continued influence of Taliban and al-Qaida ideologies and forces.

The Bonn Conference lacks the means to secure this kind of support for Afghanistan. However, it can bring to light many of the problems the Central Asian country will face in the coming years for the international community. Additionally, Pakistan’s absence will draw attention to the porous border between the two countries and the inability to seal Afghanistan off from radical influences. Though it may not provide a promise of support to the fledgling democracy in Kabul, Bonn may achieve more than its predecessor in 2001 did in drawing attention to the needs of Afghanistan’s government and people.

The cache includes poems, commercial records and other documents that may have originated from Silk Road merchants. The material may be useful in uncovering previously unknown details about Afghan Jewish civilization in the medieval era.

While the discovery itself is a compelling piece of historical evidence, it is evidence of a larger problem that continues to plague Afghanistan, more than a decade into a destructive war.

Cultural and religious art and artifacts have been leaking out of Afghanistan’s porous borders for years; a tide a few guardians have attempted to stem since 1979. The National Museum of Afghanistan in Kabul trusted its treasures unto a group of key holders who locked the materials safely away in the museum.

That did not stop the Soviets and then the Taliban from destroying a good portion of the museum’s collection. However, in recent years, the museum has begun to exhibit its goods once again while undergoing preservation processes on damaged items.

The museum now boasts about 6,000 visitors a year and is succeeding in preserving its stock of culturally historical Afghan artifacts. Yet, the problem of goods smuggled onto the black market continues, as the recent discovery of the Jewish documents prove. The current war in Afghanistan is only one in a series of conflicts dating back three decades; conflicts which have inspired tons of historical and religious treasures to be sold or go missing as opportunists have ravaged Afghanistan’s cultural goods.

The decision came on the heels of the deaths of four French soldiers at the hands of the Afghan soldier they were training. The French force will leave the patrolling of Kapisa Province near Kabul short 3,600 to the rest of the 127,000 NATO troops remaining in the country. Leaving Afghanistan could also prove to be a political boon to Sarkozy who stands for reelection later this year.

Prime Minister David Cameron confirmed that Britain’s commitment to Afghanistan will be maintained through at least 2014. Cameron said that withdrawal will depend on the ability of Afghan forces to maintain control of the country.

A large part of Britain’s responsibility in Afghanistan has been to train the fledgling Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan National Army (ANA). Cameron says the building of such forces remains ‘on target’.

However, the French immediately suspended their training efforts with the ANA following the shooting on 20 January. Western efforts to train Afghan forces have seen mixed results.

The ANA has been vastly improved since its inception in the early years of the war but problems still plague the force. Corruption is common among high-level officers and living conditions remain poor. Distrust between ANA soldiers and their Western counterparts has spawned a number of killings of British, American and French trainers.

However, cultural differences remain one of the biggest problems to plague the Army. Intra-force divisions along tribal and ethnic lines complements a language barrier between the officially Dari-speaking force, and the Pashtu majority in the Southern provinces.

Thus, the ANA and ANP may not be strong enough to provide security for the conflict-ridden state for some years, indicating an extension of the commitment made by Western forces to support Afghanistan, be it militarily or politically.

Meanwhile, the United States is beginning to engage in peace talks in Saudi Arabia. Afghanistan has asked Pakistan’s foreign minister for access to top Taliban officials, particularly Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, who was captured in Pakistan in 2010. Afghan officials hope that the meetings will help ease tensions between the neighbouring countries.

Detainees from Libya’s war against supporters of the late dictator are reportedly facing torture in their thousands as the provisional NTC government endeavours to assert its authority. United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay has expressed extreme concern for the fate of these detainees, urging the NTC to bring these detention centres under the authority of the justice ministry and general prosecutors office, granting them a fair trial. However, Libya’s provisional government is struggling, attempting to wrestle control of the country from increasingly belligerent fighters while simultaneously grappling with its own legitimacy.

This could be the failure of the irresponsible few to maintain the values of the revolution; but perhaps this is the first sign of significant retributive activity in the aftermath of successful 2011-2012 uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa- perhaps it presents us with a forecast for the future of other nations in similar situations, and serves as a warning to all those involved in political activity in the region, both domestically and internationally.

The overwhelming power of the majority, and the consequential marginalisation of the minority, has been a perennial flaw in democratic theory since its inception, but it is particularly prevalent in post-revolutionised countries. Once those in power are ousted, they become the new heretics, vilified as the minority who propped up the old regime. One can argue that the unity of the majority is a useful platform for a functional representative governance because shared values and aspirations can promote a country’s progress, but when it is a unity forged by a common enemy, power becomes a tyranny of the masses rather than a just all-inclusive democracy.

Without mitigation, revenge against the new heretics in political vacuity can lead not only to abuses of human rights in a temporary transitional phase, but to the replacement of one totalitarian state with another. A society fired up by the fervour of change, intent on reintroducing national and religious values to a country starved of it under repressive and foreign ideologies, and resistant to the anomie of Western liberal capitalism, is likely to reduce freedom of the individual to a system where individuality is attained only through association with the community; a unity forged by a common domestic enemy will lead to retributive persecution and the formulation of a polity which prevents intellectual freedom and ultimately, democracy.

This sort of fragmented, seemingly uncontrollable retribution is a frequent outcome of revolutionary and rapid regime change. In the midst of the chaos of the uprising, and the resulting absence of authority, activists taste independence from any form of governance. In lieu of any strong, central command, local strongholds and militias are necessarily formed, and vigilante justice takes  hold. This is the gritty reality of not only creating structures and processes that, prior to revolution, did not exist, but also reviving societal cohesion following the turmoil and trauma of the Arab Spring.

In Libya, reports are emerging of an estimated 8000 pro-Gaddafi supporters being held in secret detention centres by revolutionary militias, still independent of any central governing force. Several people died from torture, and ‘Medecins Sans Frontieres has suspended operations in Misrata after treating 115 patients with torture-related wounds’. With armed gangs yet an ever-present force in Libya, and the interim National Transitional Council unable to exert authority or control over them, the stage is set for vengeful eradication of what is left of Gaddafi’s loyalists, a classification often decided by whoever is wielding weapons.

In Syria, political violence has already gripped Homs and may well spread further across the country. Bashar al-Assad’s highly militarised security regime, and all who support it, have become demonised as opponents to the dignity of the country and people of Syria. The problem there is that political violence is appearing along religious lines- the Alawite community’s emergence into the political infrastructure during Hafez al-Assad’s rule has caused tensions between the Sunni majority and the Alawite minority which are based on a resentment felt towards the government, rather than the differences in theology. But many of the new heretics in Syria’s case are Alawites, and retributive violence could turn from political to sectarian in motivation if stability is not regained quickly. Many consider sectarianism in Syria to be a fallacy generated by mendacious governmental propaganda which portrays activists as Islamic terrorists and designed to frighten non-Muslim minorities into submission and loyalty to the regime. But again, retributive violence might be only one dimension of the problem- Islam might be utilised in uniting the majority against the minority.

Crisis Project asked London-based Syrians what they wanted from a new Syria- the answer was almost unanimously: whatever the people decide they want. However, this is democracy in its simplest form- rather than stimulated and reasoned debate in the public sphere for the purposes of accountable governance, ‘democracy’ is limited to language and nothing more. And when asked about the role of Islam in a new Syrian politics, many answered that the majority of Syrians were Muslims, so the new politics must reflect that. To be clear, Islam can be conflated with democracy and individual liberty can be promoted through Islamic values. But depending on the most preferred Islamic intelligentsia in a country, political Islam is also capable of restricting certain voices and preventing open debate.

The problem may well arise in Egypt too. Although retributive violence is unlikely, there seems to be a gap between the word or notion of ‘democracy’ and the implementation of a representative governance. Article 3 of the 2011 Provisional Egyptian Constitution ‘sovereignty is from the people only’ but Article 56 gives all administrative control to the military. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces are due to step down after the Presidential elections in July and will be handing over authority to a lower house occupied largely by the ‘Freedom and Justice Party’ (The Muslim Brotherhood) and the ‘Al-Nour’ Party (Salafists). It will be interesting to see how the constitution is changed and who gains control of interpreting the Quran- this will determine how far the rule of law is based on a particular identity and how those excluded from that community are perceived.

Action must be taken now across the Middle East and North Africa to prevent the revolutions creating a renewed tyranny of the masses. Retributive violence can take place in the chaos of the immediate aftermath- provisional government bodies such as the Syrian National Council need to plan how members of the old regime will be dealt with if the government falls. Further, the institutionalisation of  polities defined by the interests and identity of the majority, disregarding the rights of minorities, is a distinct possibility if provisional government bodies do not substantiate the calls for ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’. The international community should also provide assistance wherever it is needed and wanted because retributive violence will have transnational as well as national implications and future governments and citizens will suffer as a result.

By Luke Errington-Barnes and Michael Everard, 27/01/2012